

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**READY, FIRE, AIM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICA'S PREVENTIVE WAR  
POLICY**

by

Lieutenant Colonel David E. Funk  
United States Army

Colonel James Embrey  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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## ABSTRACT

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In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. developed a National Security Strategy predicated on a policy of preemption, otherwise known as the Bush Doctrine. In 2003, the U.S. tested that doctrine when it invaded Iraq. However, in practice the Iraq invasion represented not preemption but preventive war. This paper analyzes the costs of America's preventive war in Iraq as measured against two entities: the international community and the U.S. populace. This paper concludes that by pursuing preventive war in Iraq, the U.S. has measurably reduced its flexibility in addressing other existing and future security threats. Within the international community the *jus ad bellum* perceptions of America's actions have resulted in the loss of support and assistance, not only in Iraq, but also the larger global war on terrorism. On the domestic front, and for other than *jus ad bellum* reasons, the U.S. Administration has lost the support of the populace. As the cry of "no more Iraqs" echoes throughout America, the U.S. Administration now has less flexibility to address other remaining threats. In the end, the costs of preventive war have been too high and the preventive war policy cannot and should not survive.



## READY, FIRE, AIM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICA'S PREVENTIVE WAR POLICY

It is by now axiomatic, if overstated, that the world changed on 11 September 2001 (9/11). Among the things that certainly did change was America's policy with regard to foreign security threats. In a 2002 commencement address at the United States Military Academy, and in the National Security Strategy (NSS) that followed it, President Bush informed the world that in the future the U.S. would not, ". . . wait for threats to fully materialize. . .,"<sup>1</sup> and that the U.S. would, ". . . act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed."<sup>2</sup> These statements soon became known as the "Bush Doctrine."

Less than a year later, the United States implemented that doctrine when it invaded Iraq. While the language of both the President's speech and the NSS advocated preemption, it is clear that the invasion of Iraq fell closer to what analysts call "preventive war." The difference is more than semantic and it is time to explore the implications. This paper investigates the pragmatic implications of America's preventive war actions, both within the international community and the U.S. populace, and what that portends for America's future ability to shape world affairs. This paper first clarifies the concept of preventive war, and distinguishes it from preemption. It then analyzes the war in Iraq in terms of its effects on U.S. relationships with international players such as the United Nations (UN), potential allies, and third-party nations. Next, the paper analyzes the domestic support for or against the war, and the extent to which that support is a function of preventive war policies as opposed to other phenomenon. Finally, the paper offers recommendations for future U.S. policy as America continues to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

The evidence shows that America's preventive war in Iraq has represented a costly deviation from the stated policy of preemption, thus reducing U.S. flexibility in responding not only to the GWOT but also to other security threats. In the international arena this is largely because of the *jus ad bellum* perceptions of America's actions. The U.S. has reduced its leverage with international bodies such as the UN, alienated many of its traditional allies at a time when they are most needed, and encouraged a new and dangerous international standard of conduct. Simultaneously, but largely for other than *jus ad bellum* reasons, U.S. domestic support for the effort in Iraq has progressively waned, begging the question of how America reasonably can respond to other existing or emerging threats while the mantra of "no more Iraqs" echoes in the background.

## Preventive War Defined

The concept of preventive war is often confused with its close cousin, preemption. Given that U.S. policy espouses preemption, and invasion of Iraq demonstrated preventive war, understanding the difference is important. Simply stated, preemption is, “An attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.”<sup>3</sup> It seeks to act before the enemy can act and holds as fundamental to its logic that an adversary has demonstrated both the ability and intent to attack. Israel’s attacks in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War are an example of preemption. Surrounded and out-numbered by Arab neighbors who displayed both the ability and intent to do harm, Israel decided the outcome first by attacking preemptively.<sup>4</sup> In contrast, preventive war is, “A war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk.”<sup>5</sup> It seeks to act before a prospective enemy has either clearly developed the ability or demonstrated the intent to do you harm. It is a hedge against an unknown and potentially dangerous future.<sup>6</sup> The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor represented Imperial Japan’s attempt to prevent America’s growing power and influence in the resource-rich southern Pacific.

Both preemption and preventive war are subsumed in Just War Theory, the set of international conventions and norms that describes when nations legitimately can conduct war, *jus ad bellum*, and how legitimately they may conduct that war, *jus in bello*. Steeped in religious, legal, and moral traditions, Just War Theory argues that several criteria must exist before a nation may go to war. First, a just cause must exist – nations must have a legitimate reason for war. Second, necessity – war must be a last resort. Third, proportionality – the harm caused must not be disproportional to the values being protected. Fourth, right intention – war may only redress the injustice that made war necessary and may not be used to advance other interests. Finally, right authority – only the sovereign power has the right to wage war.<sup>7</sup> While preemption enjoys nearly universal international acceptance as a legitimate extension of self-defense, preventive war does not. Despite the rationalizing rhetoric the U.S. Administration employed at the time, much of the world did not accept the invasion of Iraq as a necessary and legal form of preemption, and the effects of waging an unaccepted preventive war have been considerably negative for the U.S.

## The Costs of Preventive War Within the International Community

Historians will argue over when the U.S. Administration made up its mind finally and irrevocably to invade Iraq. Lost in the din of the current debate is the fact that “regime change in Iraq” has been a formal tenet of U.S. policy since 1998.<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, what is clear is the date

when the President began making the case for war before the international community. In his 12 September 2002 address to the UN General Assembly, President Bush devoted three quarters of his speech to Iraq. The President offered in broad terms three transgressions that would become America's *casus belli*: Saddam's continued attempt to develop and procure weapons of mass destruction (WMD); his possible ties to al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations; and the brutal oppression of the Iraqi people.<sup>9</sup> The President challenged the UN to, "... serve the purpose of its founding . . ." lest the UN render itself irrelevant.<sup>10</sup> Implicit in the speech was the notion that, absent UN action, the U.S. was willing to address the Iraqi threat unilaterally.

Shortly after President Bush's veiled threat, Iraq's Foreign Minister submitted a letter to the UN Secretary-General expressing Iraq's willingness to readmit international weapons inspectors. The U.S. administration was unimpressed by the offer, calling it, "... [Saddam's] latest play . . .", and again challenging the UN to fulfill its obligations.<sup>11</sup> Along with Great Britain, the U.S. lobbied for a new UN resolution backed by the threat of force in order to rid the world of the Iraqi threat. The majority of the international community did not favor such a resolution, preferring instead to allow inspectors to do their jobs.<sup>12</sup> Nonetheless, on 8 November 2002, the UN Security Council responded to continued pressure by passing unanimously UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1441, a compromise meant to increase pressure on Saddam, while stopping short of authorizing military action.<sup>13</sup> Although international weapons inspectors found no evidence of WMD in Iraq over the next several months,<sup>14</sup> the U.S. drive to war continued.

At its core, the philosophical divide between the U.S. and its supporters and the rest of the world centered on the *jus ad bellum* question. Specifically the U.S. believed that military force aimed at regime change was not only justified but was also the only guarantee against Iraq's continued threat to regional and world peace, the evidence of WMD notwithstanding. The majority of the international community doubted that war was necessary and refused to sanction an action as drastic as regime change. Central to the debate was whether the U.S. had fully demonstrated several *jus ad bellum* criteria: First was a just cause – whether Iraq possessed WMD and whether such possession constituted an imminent threat. Second was whether the U.S. had convinced the world that war was a justifiable last resort – that in fact all peaceful options were exhausted. Finally, there was the question of right authority – whether the U.S. could go to war absent UN approval.<sup>15</sup> When the U.S. and its supporters invaded Iraq in defiance of the rest of the world in March 2003, the philosophical divide became a practical one.<sup>16</sup>

## Reduced International Leverage Within the UN

It is one thing to accuse the UN of rendering itself irrelevant by its seeming unwillingness to act on a particular problem. It is quite another thing to demonstrate that irrelevance by acting unilaterally, and then discovering that the UN needs to be very relevant indeed in order to address other extant problems. Such is the position the U.S. finds itself in today with regard not only to Iraq, but also other existing and emerging security issues. As the U.S. comes to grips with the limits of its military reach, it finds itself forced to lean more on the UN to help solve these issues. Unfortunately, the UN is both less inclined and less able to address many of these concerns precisely because of America's invasion of Iraq.

Almost immediately after the fall of Saddam, the U.S. and UN disagreed again over the issue of UN participation. Having reluctantly conceded its inability to prevent U.S. actions, the UN nonetheless sought to remain relevant in post-war reconstruction. Concurrently, the U.S. conceded the need for increased legitimacy and reluctantly agreed to a larger UN role in Iraq. In August 2003, the UN Security Council authorized the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, led by Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, who had been in Iraq since May.<sup>17</sup> On 19 August 2003, a bomb-laden truck exploded outside de Mello's UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing him and nearly two dozen others.<sup>18</sup> Aside from its immediate, tragic effects, the attack was also a violent way of communicating a larger message that the Muslim world was angered that the UN had allowed itself to become, “. . . subservient to U.S. goals.”<sup>19</sup>

Perceptions matter; whether the UN has become subservient to the U.S. is debatable. What is clear, however, is that the U.S., far from realizing its goal of using Iraq as a springboard for transforming the Middle East, is today increasingly challenged to address other issues in the Middle East and beyond because of perceptions on Iraq. In July 2006, with fighting raging in Lebanon, the UN sent an envoy to Beirut to attempt to reduce the violence between Israel and Hezbollah. The UN representative was joined by an envoy from the European Union (EU), as well as top ministers from France. Notably absent was any top-level representative from the U.S. When asked what the U.S. might be able to accomplish if it were to send a rep, Arthur Hughes, a noted Middle East scholar, was not optimistic. “Not a great deal, frankly,” he replied. “Very regrettably, the United States' leverage and prestige in the region is probably at a low point, because of...Iraq.”<sup>20</sup>

This reduced U.S. leverage extends to other trouble spots around the world. Even before (and perhaps induced by the imminence of) the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, North Korea boldly announced its violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, admitting to its active pursuit of nuclear



weapons.<sup>21</sup> In a move described by some as disingenuous, the U.S. responded with the “regrettable development” language normally reserved for lesser crises, but stopped short of threatening military action.<sup>22</sup> Instead, the U.S. sought a diplomatic solution via the UN Security Council.

The irony of the matter, which was not lost on Kim Jong Il, was that with U.S. forces inextricably bound for Iraq, and the UN’s corresponding inability to exert meaningful influence on that matter, neither the U.S. nor the UN was able to respond in any meaningful way to North Korean recalcitrance. Pyongyang had done the calculations and decided that both the U.S. and the UN had insufficient leverage. Three and one-half years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, North Korea tested its first nuclear device.<sup>23</sup> It is easy today to lament the UN’s continuing inability to address the crisis, but that would do injustice to the memory of how it evolved the way it did.

In an eerily similar situation, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced in February 2003 that Iran, the third member of the “Evil Axis,” was constructing a uranium enrichment facility – a key step toward building a nuclear device.<sup>24</sup> The U.S. has responded by pursuing a diplomatic solution similar to the one employed for North Korea. Regrettably, the results have been similarly unsatisfying. Iran has calculated that, “. . . the Bush administration cannot attack them.”<sup>25</sup> Since the threat of U.S. force is usually the surest, if not the only enforcement mechanism in the UN, the UN is similarly powerless. Even worse, Iran now appears to have leverage over the U.S. that even North Korea lacks. In a sickly twisted turn of events, there is now a strong call for the U.S. to engage Iran diplomatically in order to address the Iraqi crisis, and not Iran’s nuclear ambitions.<sup>26</sup>

The U.S. has exercised its right to defy the collective will of the UN several times in the past.<sup>27</sup> However, the near-unilateral decision to invade Iraq appears to have been a watershed event within that governing body. In years past, U.S. defiance was based mostly on non-action (i.e., not joining the fray). The invasion of Iraq, however, required the U.S. to demonstrate its defiance through positive action. Worse yet, this action was anathema to the very purpose for which the UN had been created. The result has been reduced U.S. leverage in world affairs. Moreover, in the weirdly reciprocal calculus of power that exists perhaps only in international politics, the UN suffered a concurrent decline in its influence.

#### The Alienation of U.S. Allies

During one of the many UN debates leading up to the war in Iraq, French Foreign Minister Galouzeau de Villepin issued a warning: “To those who believe war would be the quickest way to disarm Iraq, I can reply that it would create divisions and cause wounds that will be long in

healing.”<sup>28</sup> Perhaps even Mr. de Villepin missed the double entendre contained in his speech. America’s preventive war in Iraq has indeed created divisions and wounds, not the least of which is among the U.S. and its traditional allies.

Even conceding the limited utility of the UN as a global governing body, there remains the hard fact that the U.S. cannot address certain security issues well without allied support. A global war on terrorism requires global support and participation. President Bush recognized this when he declared, “. . . we know that to defeat terrorism in today’s globalized world we need support from our allies and friends.”<sup>29</sup> While many traditional friends and allies contributed readily to America’s efforts in Afghanistan, assistance with operations in Iraq has been quite muted.

Within a month after 9/11, nearly 70 nations had pledged support for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Among the quickest to respond were the then-nineteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which for the first time in its history, invoked Article 5 of its collective defense charter.<sup>30</sup> In addition to the powerful message of solidarity this conveyed to international terrorists, it had the practical effect of reducing the burden on U.S. operations in Afghanistan during the fight and succeeding reconstruction. By 2003, NATO had assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, relieving the U.S. of a large portion of the responsibility for rebuilding the country.<sup>31</sup>

Allied support in Iraq has been a very different story. As America prepared to invade Iraq, NATO was notably absent from the “coalition of the willing.”<sup>32</sup> The first evidence of the lack of allied support was prior to the invasion when Turkey rejected U.S. requests to stage coalition forces in its territory in order to open up a northern front.<sup>33</sup> Analysts have disagreed over the impact that this had on efforts to establish order immediately after the fall of Baghdad. What is certain is that the U.S. was hampered operationally by having to divert the U.S. 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division to Kuwait.

Turkey’s rebuff was only the first sign of allied dissatisfaction with America’s actions. Many of America’s traditional allies, most notably those in “old Europe,” demurred when invited either to join or support the coalition. Moreover, among the nations that did join the U.S., there has been a slow but steady exodus as many of them have responded to domestic or international pressure by withdrawing their troops. The allied contribution to OIF numbered around 38 countries and 50,000 troops at its height in 2003. By the beginning of 2006, it was down to 28 countries and around 20,000 troops.<sup>34</sup> Those who mock America’s “coalition of the willing” might observe that it has become, over time, a “coalition of the fewer.” In the end it is

clear that four years into Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S. continues to shoulder nearly the entire burden of stabilizing Iraq.

This existing rift between the U.S. and its allies extends beyond the current fight in Iraq. As the U.S. pursues the larger GWOT, the PEW Research Center notes that, “. . . a growing percentage of Europeans want foreign policy and security arrangements independent from the United States.”<sup>35</sup> The evidence is clear and overwhelming that there is a growing mistrust in the world concerning American motives and power. To the extent such mistrust leads allies to distance themselves from American efforts, prosecuting the GWOT will be that much more difficult.

If the tragedy of 9/11 brought about any good it was precisely the increased solidarity the U.S. enjoyed with the much of the rest of the world as a result of having suffered a terrorist attack. In essence, the U.S. witnessed a rise in its “soft power,” its ability to influence others in the international community. However, in the perceived rush to employ “hard power” in Iraq, the U.S. suffered a precipitous decline in influence. Perhaps nothing has illustrated this decline as vividly as the recent UN session where Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, drew approving applause and laughter with his “Bush is the devil” tirade.<sup>36</sup> If the loss of American influence were only symbolic, one might simply shrug it off as typical “America bashing.” However, the downturn in world sentiment toward the U.S. extends beyond mere name calling. As the continuing loss of allies in Iraq illustrates, the distance between emotion and action is often very short. Moreover, the vitriol directed toward America today comes from the “who’s who” list of traditional U.S. allies, those upon whom essential support for the GWOT depends.

### Revising Standards For Just War

The U.S. has long considered itself to be not just a great nation, but more importantly a good nation. Even the most ardent U.S. detractors have grudgingly recognized that America’s moral failings in the past have usually erred on the side of inaction rather than aggression.<sup>37</sup> When America has criticized and acted to counter the violently aggressive actions of rogue leaders and their regimes, it has always been from a position of moral authority. That position is now haunted by the specter of Iraq - an act of commission rather than omission.

Even worse, the U.S. may have inadvertently broadened the category of permissible war in its attempts to implement moral justice for itself, the Iraqi people, and the world. Because the *jus ad bellum* aspect of Just War Theory provides broad guidance about the permissibility of going to war, most of the criteria are not empirical, but instead require interpretation (i.e., a just cause or last resort). The U.S. employed a rather narrow and situational interpretation of these

criteria to justify its actions in Iraq. While much of the world disagreed, there should have been real concerns that others were “taking notes.” Henry Kissinger, perhaps the ultimate political realist, warned in 2002 that America’s impending invasion of Iraq risked making preventive war, “. . . a universal principle available to every nation.” While citing his clear support for regime change in Iraq, Kissinger cautioned that acceptance of a doctrine of preventive war would give license to countries like India and Pakistan to attack one another.<sup>38</sup> Those who supported Saddam Hussein’s removal from power countered Kissinger’s concern by suggesting that the world must understand that what was permissible for the U.S. must not be universally allowed to other nations. It is not clear the world understands.

That no other nation to date has exercised the “right” of preventive war is no large comfort. The point is when a preventive war occurs the U.S. will have little moral authority to take the offending nation to task. The U.S. has made preventive war a legitimate tool of statecraft and this may be the biggest, if yet unpaid, cost of U.S. actions in Iraq.

#### The Costs of Preventive War *vis-à-vis* the Domestic Populace

Notwithstanding the implications of preventive war within the international community, it is clear that as a democracy, the U.S. requires at least the tacit support of its own citizens in order to pursue such a policy. Given traditionally low American regard for UN effectiveness, it is important to remember that until 2004, the majority of American citizens were squarely in favor of the use of force in Iraq. While polling data are often confusing and contradictory, they do provide a flavor of U.S. sentiment on the issue.

#### Making the Domestic Case For War

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and before the first bombs had even fallen on Afghanistan, nearly seven in ten Americans indicated in a Gallup Poll that removing Saddam Hussein from power was “very important.”<sup>39</sup> An even higher 84% attached a similar importance to “Destroying terrorist operations outside of Afghanistan.”<sup>40</sup> A vocal minority counseled against war with Iraq on both moral and pragmatic grounds, warning that it would be tangential to the GWOT, rather than an integral part of overall success. However, the message from the American majority was clear - America was ready to lash out, not only against al Qaeda but also Saddam Hussein and anyone else who posed an actual or perceived threat to the U.S.

Of course, the very essence of the distinction between preemption and preventive war was the extent to which Saddam Hussein represented an imminent threat as opposed to a latent one. If Americans were convinced that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq represented a “clear and present danger,” they would not only support the use of force, but would virtually demand it.

That message was not lost on the U.S. Administration. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, the President delivered his now-famous “Axis of Evil” speech to Congress, the American people, and the world. Flush with apparent victory in Afghanistan and riding a wave of domestic support, the President identified Iran, North Korea, and Iraq as regimes that, “. . . pose a great and growing danger.” He then asserted that the U.S., “. . . will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”<sup>41</sup> The Congress and the American public greeted these pronouncements with applause and approval.

Polls issued just after the President’s address indicated that nearly 80% of Americans believed Iraq either had or was trying to develop weapons that would threaten the U.S. Furthermore, 88% of respondents felt it was either very important or somewhat important to remove Saddam from power.<sup>42</sup> These numbers represented a virtual mandate from the American people to eliminate the Iraq threat. In October 2002, both houses of Congress formalized such a mandate by overwhelmingly passing Resolutions authorizing the President to use the armed forces of the U.S. against Iraq.<sup>43</sup> However, as events have unfolded over the past four years, it is clear that the emotions that allowed a democracy to pursue a preventive war cannot long sustain such a war.

#### Preventive War Clashes With American Expectations

American support for OIF remained above 50% until sometime in 2004.<sup>44</sup> By then the underlying and compelling factors behind the mandate for war had proven grievously false. First, Iraq had no WMD. Second, Saddam’s ties to al Qaeda (or any other terrorist group) were proven tenuous at best. In other words, two of the three legs of America’s preventive war stool had been unceremoniously kicked out from under it (the third being Saddam’s brutal tyranny). It would be easy to claim a direct causal link between these errors and America’s declining support, but the evidence simply does not support such an easy conclusion. In a 2004 ABC News poll, respondents said by more than a two to one margin that war with Iraq would be justified even if no WMD were found.<sup>45</sup> Similarly, as late as 2004 nearly seven in ten respondents believed that despite all apparent evidence to the contrary Saddam Hussein was likely involved in the 9/11 attacks.<sup>46</sup>

Other observers have claimed that America’s declining support for the war effort is tied to ever-increasing U.S. casualties. Inherent in this claim is a long-standing perception that Americans are casualty-averse, and when body bags start coming home, support for war drops dramatically. Those seduced by this logic are ignoring both the history of America’s past wars and the reality of the current one. As late as June 2005, nearly 60% of Americans thought the

U.S. should keep military forces in Iraq until civil order was restored, even if it meant continued U.S. casualties.<sup>47</sup> In fact, history shows that if American citizens believe enough in the cause, they will accept large numbers of casualties. As one author correctly observes, “. . . the American public [is] ‘defeat-phobic’ rather than ‘casualty-phobic.’”<sup>48</sup>

We arrive then at the primary cause of America’s declining support for the war. Domestic support for the OIF has waned not because of the moral failings of preventive war, not because of the absence of WMD, nor even because of continuing casualties, although each of these phenomena exacerbates the drop. Instead, Americans are displaying their disfavor with the unpalatable notion that the U.S. has committed the unpardonable mistake of not winning within an acceptable timeframe.

In a December 2003 poll, a solid 65% of Americans believed the U.S. effort in Iraq was going well. By April 2004, a scant five months later, that number dipped to 38%. A similar poll only one month later indicated that only 31% of respondents believed the U.S. was winning the war.<sup>49</sup> These perceptions of a lack of success closely mirror the related polls indicating a drop in overall support for the war. The sad truth is that as the promise of rapid, decisive victory through “shock and awe” gave way to the hard reality of slow, patient, and resource-intensive counter-insurgency and nation-building, the American public quickly became disillusioned with the war. The “stay the course” rhetoric emanating from the Bush Administration served only to further inflame the apparent disconnect between expectation and result. In essence, preventive war in Iraq slammed headlong into American beliefs about the decisive and effective use of overwhelming military power.<sup>50</sup> The costs, both immediate and far-reaching, have been significant.

Among the immediate effects of America’s dissatisfaction with the war is the reduced flexibility of the current Administration to prosecute the war the way it chooses. The 2006 Congressional elections, coupled with the “resignation” of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, represented a clear shot across the bow of the administration’s Iraq policy. Even if “staying the course” in Iraq were the best option, it is no longer possible. Instead, the administration now faces the prospect of choosing among a series of unpleasant alternatives ranging from immediate withdrawal, to cozying up to the governments of Iran and Syria, to a last-ditch surge of several thousands of troops in an effort to stabilize Iraq.<sup>51</sup> In short, while the U.S. Administration had the necessary leverage to initiate a preventive war in Iraq, it has lost the necessary leverage to conclude it quickly and favorably.

Perhaps no endeavor more than war measures a president’s acumen for grand decision-making. Given that, it should come as no surprise that Americans make little distinction

between their views of the President as Commander-in-Chief on the one hand and as the Chief Executive of the nation on the other.<sup>52</sup> As a result, the Administration lost more than an election in November of 2006. There has been the additional loss of support for many domestic policies. As the President and his closest advisers increasingly find themselves in the role of political pariahs, alienated even from many members of their own party, they are encountering immense difficulties in pursuing a coherent and effective domestic agenda.<sup>53</sup>

Finally, the prolonged and costly experience in Iraq has virtually guaranteed that no serious military options are possible to counter Iran or North Korea, the two remaining members of the Axis of Evil. That the U.S. military is stretched too thinly for such deterring options is obvious. The less obvious but more important reason is that the U.S. populace would not likely allow such actions. The cry of “no more Iraqs” already resonates today the way a similar cry did a generation ago. Iran and North Korea may represent bigger threats today than Saddam did in 2003, but that is irrelevant to the American people.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The capstone doctrinal publication for U.S. Joint Forces makes clear the conditions required for American success in the world:

The ability of the United States to influence events to its advantage worldwide depends in large measure on *the will of its citizenry*, the vitality of its social institutions, *the strength of its relations with like-minded multinational partners*, and the *effectiveness of the Government in employing the instruments of national power*. [Emphasis added]<sup>54</sup>

Published in 2000, the manual pre-dates the events of 9/11, yet it is hard to argue that the world changed so much on that fateful day as to invalidate the ideals contained therein.

Unfortunately, by pursuing preventive war in Iraq – in essence, by firing before it had a good aim on international terrorism – the U.S. has itself invalidated many of these ideals. The evidence is clear that the Bush Doctrine (as executed) has resulted in profound and long-reaching strategic costs. America’s tarnished position within the international community, coupled with the concurrent loss of faith by U.S. domestic populace, has reduced U.S. flexibility in addressing not only the GWOT but also other extant threats as well.

Machiavelli’s sage advice that it is safer to be feared than loved assumes the likelihood that a nation can choose to be one or the other. The U.S. today is facing the unhappy prospect of being neither loved nor feared. As General (Retired) Barry McCaffrey recently noted, “Global animosity toward US foreign policy and the Administration is universal, intense, and growing.”<sup>55</sup> This animosity is increasingly resident not only among U.S. antagonists but also among its

allies. While emotion without action might be tolerable, recent history shows that nations are indeed acting with increasingly less regard for U.S. views. These actions have put at risk not only current success in Iraq but also the larger GWOT.

Additionally, prosecution of the war in Iraq has led prospective U.S. enemies to believe they have discovered America's Achilles Heel. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, evidence suggests there were strong feelings of trepidation among America's antagonists; even some of Osama bin Laden's closest associates expressed concern about the U.S. retribution that might result from the events of 9/11.<sup>56</sup> As the U.S. completes its fourth frustrating year in Iraq, that trepidation has waned. The world has witnessed the limits of America's military might. Immediately following 9/11, Iran and North Korea may well have accelerated their nuclear programs as counter-balances to the prospect of future U.S. attacks, but they continue such activity today secure in the knowledge that such attacks border on impossible. The thinly-stretched U.S. military is only part of the explanation. Equally important is the prevailing U.S. domestic environment.

While the American populace has steadfastly maintained support for its Soldiers, it has slowly but inexorably lost its enthusiasm for the Iraq War and the administration's conduct of it. In the main, this loss of support has been based less on any moral doubts about preventive war in general and more on the results of a particular war. If in 2003 the prospect of Saddam's WMD indicated that the U.S. should attack Iraq, the recent and apparently-easy victory in Afghanistan seemed to indicate it could. By 2004, both of these notions had crumbled, replaced by the painful truths of counterinsurgency and nation building. As Andrew Bacevich noted, "A doctrine of preventive war requires that the forces engaged accomplish their mission swiftly, economically, and without leaving loose ends."<sup>57</sup> This is not what the American people have witnessed in Iraq.

While the sources of domestic wrath have been different from those of the international community, the results are no less painful. As in the international community, the loss of domestic support is more than symbolic. In the near-term, it has shaped an election and cost a Defense Secretary his job. In the longer term, it has reduced the flexibility of the U.S. to deal with existing and emerging threats.

The efficacy of both the short-term U.S. policy toward Iraq and the longer-term policies toward remaining threats is in doubt. However, neither is totally irretrievable. First, the U.S. must conclude OIF favorably. It is ironic that in pursuing a preventive war, the U.S. finds itself with only one suitable option – sustaining the effort to win the war, no matter how painful. However, that it precisely what the U.S. must do. Regardless of who is to blame, it is important



to acknowledge that Iraq has indeed become the, “. . . central front in the War on Terror.”<sup>58</sup> A U.S. loss there would reverberate far beyond the borders of the Middle East, and for a very long time.

Achieving a palatable conclusion in Iraq will require the U.S. to move beyond the two extremes of “cut and run” and “stay the course.” There is a middle ground. The U.S. must mobilize and employ more fully all the instruments of national power. Until the U.S. taps the immense resources of its diplomatic, economic, and especially informational elements of power, the Iraq saga is likely to have an unhappy ending. Clearly, more complete mobilization of the nation will be very difficult. After all, the Administration that sent its soldiers off to war in 2001 simultaneously implored its citizens to go shopping or to go on vacation to rescue the ailing airline industry.<sup>59</sup> In essence, the Administration passed by a fleeting window of overwhelming support to ask the American public to share in the sacrifices of war. Nonetheless, as the Bush Presidency completes its final two years in office, it must engage the American public with large doses of candor and conciliation. Absent this effort, it may take another “9/11-like” tragedy to arouse the U.S. people for renewed action and sacrifice. Regardless of the difficulty of placing the nation on a war footing, the challenges of Iraq and the larger GWOT demand it.

Over the long term, a similar conciliatory tone would do wonders for U.S. foreign relations. During the 2000 presidential debates, Candidate George Bush won high marks for contending that U.S. foreign relations should be characterized by strength mixed with a healthy dose of humility. The future President said, “We’re a freedom-loving nation, and if we’re an arrogant nation [the world will] view us that way, but if we’re a humble nation they’ll respect us.”<sup>60</sup> Six years later, his remarks seem eerily prophetic. An honest attempt to mend geo-political fences will perhaps induce more allied cooperation in the GWOT, thus strengthening even more the U.S. position in the world. The 2006 NSS is a good start, as it contains a clearly softer tone than its 2002 predecessor.<sup>61</sup> Now words must translate to action.

In the final analysis, it is not clear the Bush Doctrine can long survive as executed in Iraq. The U.S. should lay to rest the doctrine of preventive war as a method of foreign policy and national defense. The doctrine of preemption, originally espoused in the 2002 NSS and repeated in the 2006 version, is an internationally-recognized form of self-defense. To the extent the world changed on 9/11, a doctrine of preemption makes perfect sense. The challenge for the U.S. is to understand the difference between preemption and prevention, and to act accordingly.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> George W. Bush, "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 38, 23 (10 June 2002): 946.

<sup>2</sup> Bush, *The National Security Strategy Of The United States Of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), v.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 12 April 2001 [As Amended Through 16 October 2006]), 421; available from [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new\\_pubs/jp1\\_02.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf); Internet; accessed 30 November 2006.

<sup>4</sup> Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations* New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977), 80-85.

<sup>5</sup> Joint Publication 1-02, 425.

<sup>6</sup> Mueller, 8-10.

<sup>7</sup> For background on Just War criteria, see Whitley Kaufman, "What's Wrong With Preventive War? The Moral and Legal Basis for the Preventive Use of Force," *Ethics & International Affairs* 19, 3 (2005): 24. See also Henry Alan Stephenson, *The Justice of Preventive War*, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 2004), 9-11. The preceding sources are but two of dozens available on this subject. The exact number and wording of the *jus ad bellum* criteria are as varied as the number of sources available. The criteria have undergone countless revisions and interpretations throughout history. For example, one often quoted criterion (not included in this paper) is "reasonable chance for success," meaning a country may not wage a war that it knows ahead of time is doomed to failure. To the extent there is a weakness in the *jus ad bellum* arguments for and against war, it is precisely that no official and all-encompassing definition exists. Nonetheless, the list offered in this paper is generally accepted and is sufficient to grasp the essence of the criteria.

<sup>8</sup> William Jefferson Clinton, "Statement on Signing The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 34, 45 (9 November 1998), 2210. In these remarks, President Clinton makes clear that the U.S. would, hereafter, actively support Iraqi opposition groups, and that the U.S., "...look[ed] forward to new leadership in Iraq that has the support of the Iraqi people." Uninformed critics today speak as if the current administration contrived the "regime change" idea as a way for President Bush to "finish Daddy's business."

<sup>9</sup> Bush, "Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 38, 37 (16 September 2002): 1529-33.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 1532.

<sup>11</sup> Center For Cooperative Research, "Events Leading Up to The 2003 Invasion of Iraq," available from [http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?startpos=400&timeline=complete\\_timeline\\_of\\_the\\_2003\\_invasion\\_of\\_iraq](http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?startpos=400&timeline=complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq); Internet; accessed 30 November 2006.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. Typical of world opinion was the Russian Foreign Minister's opinion that, "It is essential in the coming days to resolve the issue of the inspectors' return. For this, no new [Security Council] resolutions are needed."

<sup>13</sup> United Nations. Security Council, 4644<sup>th</sup> Meeting, "Resolution 1441 (2002)," 8 November 2002; available from <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/pdf/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement>; Internet; accessed 30 November 2006. The last part of the resolution simply reminds Iraq it will face "serious consequences" as a result of continued defiance. While the "serious consequences" language was short of what the U.S. sought, it still (at least in the minds of the U.S. administration) provided the clause necessary to justify the use of force.

<sup>14</sup> Robert Collier, "Repeated Inspections But No Hard Evidence: To Iraqis, Site Visits are a Pointless Charade," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 30 December 2002 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2002/12/30/MN223238.DTL>; Internet; accessed 30 November 2006.

<sup>15</sup> See *Charter of the United Nations*, available from <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>; Internet; accessed 6 November 2006. Chapter 7 of the UN Charter allows for two instances when war is authorized: In self-defense against the aggression of another, or when such actions are agreed upon by the Security Council. Historically, nations that go to war absent either of these conditions face consequences ranging from simple condemnation to armed response from UN member nations.

<sup>16</sup> None of the history detailed in this paper is meant to pass moral judgment on U.S. actions. There was after all, (until the invasion proved otherwise), some level of international doubt concerning Saddam's WMD program and his possible ties to terrorists. Also, neither the U.S. nor any other nation should be expected, as a matter of policy, to surrender its sovereignty to an international body that had demonstrated a ten-year record of impotence in dealing with Saddam. Finally, Saddam's record of humanitarian abuse was obvious and appalling. The point is that in the eyes of the international body none of this rose to a level requiring military force. As the U.S. would discover, flaunting the wishes of the international community in an endeavor as serious as war carries measurable costs.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations Information Service, "Security Council Establishes UN Assistance Mission in Iraq, Welcomes Creation of Governing Council as 'Important Step,'" 14 August 2003; available from <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2003/sc7843.html>; Internet; accessed 13 December 2006. Despite prior reluctance on the Part of the U.S. to turn the Iraq mission over to the UN, the U.S. voted in favor of the resolution, no doubt partly because of the perceived legitimacy the resolution would confer on U.S. actions.

<sup>18</sup> "Truck Bomb Kills Chief U.N. Envoy to Iraq," 20 August 2003; available from <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/08/19/sprj.irq.main/>; Internet; accessed 13 December 2006.

<sup>19</sup> Salim Lone, "One More Casualty of the War on terrorism; The Dangers of Making the United Nations Subservient to U.S. Goals," *The Washington Post*, 29 August 2004 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 7 December 2006.

<sup>20</sup> Radio Free Europe, "Middle East: U.S. Leverage at a Low Point," available from <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/07/322dc1f6-fd90-4496-823a-26899b82cbde.html>; Internet; accessed 30 November 2006.

<sup>21</sup> Richard Boucher, "North Korean Nuclear Program," Department of State Press Statement (Washington, D.C.: 16 October 2002); available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14432.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 December 2006.

<sup>22</sup> See "United States Emperor: Shedding Clothes?: Foreign Policy," *The Economist*, (London, 18 January 2003) [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 13 December 2006. This is one of hundreds of articles and editorials that questioned the so-called double standard the U.S. applied in responding to Iraq and North Korea.

<sup>23</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence Public Affairs Officer, "Statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on the North Korea Nuclear Test," News Release (Washington, D.C.: 16 October 2006); available from <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/odni101606.pdf>; Internet; accessed 6 December 2006.

<sup>24</sup> Massimo Calabresi, "Iran's Nuclear Threat," *Time*, Posted 8 March 2003; available from <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,430649,00.html>; Internet; accessed 6 December 2006.

<sup>25</sup> Warren P. Strobel, "Bush Has Little Leverage to Deal With Abundant Global Crises," *McClatchey Newspapers*, 12 July 2006 [newspaper on-line]; available from [http://www.realcities.com/mld/kriwashington/news/special\\_packages/iraq/intelligence/15023972.htm](http://www.realcities.com/mld/kriwashington/news/special_packages/iraq/intelligence/15023972.htm); Internet; accessed 5 December 2006.

<sup>26</sup> James A. Baker, III, et al., "The Iraq Study Group Report," 6 December 2006, 36-ff.; available from [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq\\_study\\_group\\_report/report/1206/index.html](http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html); Internet; accessed 6 December 2006.

<sup>27</sup> By way of example, within the last decade, the U.S. has refused to sign the provisions of the Ottawa Conference (banning anti-personnel landmines), the Kyoto Protocol (limiting greenhouse emissions), and the International Criminal Court.

<sup>28</sup> Galouzeau de Villepin, Remarks before the 4714<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the UN Security Council (7 March 2003): available from <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N03/270/76/pdf/N0327076.pdf?OpenElement>; Internet; accessed 15 December 2006.

<sup>29</sup> Bush, *The National Security Strategy Of The United States Of America* (2002), 7.

<sup>30</sup> "NATO and the Fight Against Terrorism," *NATO Briefing*, March 2005; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/rtt/rtt-e.pdf>; Internet; accessed 21 December 2006. Article 5 of the NATO Charter says in essence that an attack on any NATO member(s) is tantamount to an attack on all members. The events of 9/11 provided the pretext necessary for NATO to join the U.S. in ousting the Taliban and al Qaeda from Afghanistan.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Among our NATO allies, only Great Britain, Italy, and Spain contributed significant support to OIF. In 2004, NATO approved the NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I), which has suffered from political in-fighting among NATO members, and has never exceeded more than 100 personnel. For background, see Rick Lynch and Phillip D. Janzen, “NATO Training Mission – Iraq: Looking to the Future,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 40 (1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2006), available from [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq\\_pubs/4005.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4005.pdf); Internet; accessed 21 December 2006.

<sup>33</sup> Barak A. Salmoni, “Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” *Strategic Insights* II, 7 (July 2003); available from <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/july03/middleEast.asp>; Internet; accessed 21 December 2006.

<sup>34</sup> Mark Sappenfield, “US Allies in Iraq: Valuable but Dwindling,” *The Christian Science Monitor* (4 January 2006): 3 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 22 December 2006.

<sup>35</sup> “A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Even Higher, Muslim Anger Persists,” *The PEW Research Center For the People and the Press*, (16 March 2004): 1, available from <http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/206.pdf>; Internet; accessed 21 December 2006.

<sup>36</sup> Neil King Jr., “Politics and Economics: Anti-Americanism is a Big Hit at the U.N.; Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez Provides Theatrical Performance That resonates With Some,” *The Wall Street Journal*, (21 September 2006) [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 13 December 2006.

<sup>37</sup> As well as the aforementioned U.S. resistance to join many UN initiatives, there are a host of other (normally humanitarian) initiatives the U.S. has decided are not in its interests. One of the more recent is the humanitarian tragedy in Darfur. Many nations look to the U.S. to take the lead in this endeavor based on expectations that the U.S. is morally obligated to lead the world.

<sup>38</sup> Henry Kissinger, “Our Intervention in Iraq,” *The Washington Post*, 12 August 2002, A15.

<sup>39</sup> “USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll Results,” *USA Today*, 2 February 2002; available from <http://www.usatoday.com/news/2002-02-11-poll.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 December 2006.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 38, 5 (4 February, 2002): 135.

<sup>42</sup> “USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll Results.” Ironically, the poll numbers indicated that more Americans believed Saddam had, or was trying to develop, weapons that could threaten the U.S. than believed Iran or North Korea did.

<sup>43</sup> See “Final Vote Results For Roll Call 455,” (10 October 2002); available from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll455.xml>; Internet; accessed 22 December 2006. See also United States Senate, “U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 107<sup>th</sup> Congress – 2d Session,” (11 October 2002); available from [http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll\\_call\\_lists/roll\\_call\\_vote\\_cfm?congress=107&session=2&vote=00237](http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm?congress=107&session=2&vote=00237); Internet; accessed 22 December 2006. The final vote

in the house was 296 in favor, 133 opposed, and 3 no votes. The final vote in the senate was 77 in favor and 33 opposed. The ration of for and against was about 2.4/1.

<sup>44</sup> For extensive polling results related to the war in Iraq, see American Enterprise Institute, "Public Opinion on The War With Iraq," (Washington, D.C., 15 December, 2006); available from <http://www.aei.org/publicopinion2>; Internet; accessed on multiple occasions beginning 18 December 2006. This 159 page document consist of hundreds of polls taken from 2001 to 2006. While it is difficult to gauge accurately a concept as ephemeral as "support for the war," the polling data clearly indicate that, as time went by, fewer and fewer Americans thought the Iraq invasion was a good idea. The break point, when those who did not favor the war exceeded those who did, occurred in late 2004.

<sup>45</sup> American Enterprise Institute, 106. In fact, the percentage of respondents who were so inclined actually went up from a similar poll issued in March 2003.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 116. According to this Fox News poll, 43% believed it was very likely, while 25% believed it was somewhat likely.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>48</sup> Christopher Gelpi and John Mueller, "The Cost of War," *Foreign Affairs* 85, 1 (January/February 2006); [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 30 October 2006. Although this article has two authors, each author takes a somewhat opposing view and establishes his view in separate pieces of the article. The quotation to which this endnote refers was based on Gelpi's view, thus the reference to "one author" in this paper.

<sup>49</sup> CBS News Polls, "PollingReport.com," *Iraq*; available from <http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq>; Internet; accessed 26 December 2006.

<sup>50</sup> Colin S. Gray, "Stability Operations in Strategic Perspective: A Skeptical View," *Parameters* 36, 2 (Summer 2006): [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 13 November 2006. Gray lists the characteristics of the American Way of War as: Apolitical; Astrategic; Ahistorical; Problem-solving, Optimistic; Culturally challenged; Technology dependent; Focused on firepower; Large-scale; Aggressive, Offensive; Profoundly regular, Impatient; Logistically excellent; and Highly sensitive to casualties. See also Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Toward a New American Way of War," March 2004; available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB374.pdf>; Internet; accessed 14 November 2006. Much has been written on "the American way of war." While each author develops slightly differing conclusions, there do appear to be certain quintessential characteristics that define America's approach to war. For the past fifteen years, these characteristics found perhaps no clearer voice than in the so-called "Powell Doctrine" of the late twentieth century. In brief, Powell advised that: vital national security issues must be threatened; the U.S. must have clear and attainable objectives, it must apply overwhelming military force to achieve those objectives; it must have a clear exit strategy; and it must enjoy the broad support of both the American people and the international community. Over time, Americans have come to perceive the war in Iraq as an unforgivable violation of this doctrine. That this violation occurred during the watch of the doctrine's author is sadly ironic.

<sup>51</sup> As of this writing, the President has decided to deploy an additional 21,000+ troops to Iraq. The move, commonly dubbed "the surge," does not have the enthusiastic support of the

U.S. Congress, and it is not clear how long the strategy will be allowed to last. It appears at this juncture that many people see this is a last-ditch attempt to salvage some sort of victory. If the strategy does not produce rapid and positive results, it is almost certain the Congress will force a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Iraq after the 2008 Presidential elections.

<sup>52</sup> American Enterprise Institute, 119-132. Two separate polls measured what Americans thought of the President's overall performance and what they thought of his performance with regard to Iraq. While the numbers in each poll vary by a few degrees, the respective rises and falls show an amazing parallel. In other words, the link between perceived performance as a wartime President and overall performance is very strong.

<sup>53</sup> Robin Toner, "A Loud Message for the President," *The New York Times Upfront*, 27 November 2006 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 27 December 2006. See also "Special Report: Putting His Presidency Together Again – America's mid-term elections," *The Economist* 381, 8503 (11 November 2006) [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 27 December 2006. These are but two of many articles that describe the impending difficulties President Bush is likely to face in the domestic arena. In every area from court nominees to immigration laws, the resistance to Presidential initiatives is expected to be immense.

<sup>54</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 14 November 2000), I-5,6.

<sup>55</sup> General (Retired) Barry R. McCaffrey, "Global War on Terrorism," briefing slides prepared for National Defense University, 6 November 2006.

<sup>56</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 250-52.

<sup>57</sup> Andrew J. Bacevich, "Requiem For the Bush Doctrine," *Current History* 104, 686 (December 2005) [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 20 October 2006.

<sup>58</sup> Bush, "Remarks to Military Personnel and Families at Fort Stewart, Georgia," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 39, 37 (15 September 2003): 1199.

<sup>59</sup> Bush, "Remarks to Airline Employees in Chicago, Illinois," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 37, 39 (1 October 2001): 1383. See also Bush, "Remarks at the California Business Association Breakfast in Sacramento, California," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 37, 42 (22 October 2001): 1501.

<sup>60</sup> Commission on Presidential Debates, "The Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate," (11 October 2000); available from <http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000b.html>; Internet; accessed 29 December 2006.

<sup>61</sup> Bush, *The National Security Strategy Of The United States Of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 2006). This version retains the doctrine of preemption, but has a considerably softer tone with regard to foreign relations than did the 2002 version.

